

Appendix: Robustness analyses

As robustness checks, we rerun all our models (1) excluding the United States, (2) while control for party family, (3) with a third dependent variable that measures both intensity and position, (4) control for absolute numbers.

We decided to exclude the United States not only because they are a statistical outlier in our sample, but also initiated the two major Western military interventions after 9/11. Here, we see that in the pre-9/11 period the opposition started to dedicate more negative attention to the military in their manifestoes as military death toll rises. The opposition behaves like the government in the post 9/11 period, which could indicate that non-US countries did no longer used the military to mobilize against government (foreign) policies. Governing parties did not mention the military significantly more in the pre-9/11 and post 9/11 but did start talk significantly less positive about the military as death toll rose in the post 9/11 period.

When controlling for party family, we see that both opposition and government increased their attention to the military pre 9/11, while after 9/11 they both did not. In addition, opposition parties were overall more positive on the military in both the pre- as the post 9/11 period.

Rerunning the analyses by creating a third dependent variable that measures the difference in both intensity as position ($\Delta Y3 = \text{positive references} - \text{negative references} / \text{positive references} + \text{negative references}$), we see only a positive effect for the opposition parties before 9/11.

When controlling for absolute numbers, rather than the log variants, we see an increase in attention before 9/11 for both opposition and governing parties but no effect after 9/11. Opposition maintained their positive attitude towards the military, whereas governing parties were more negative before 9/11.

Finally, we have controlled for non-linear effects (more recent casualties might have a bigger impact) by adding the square of the log-variant of soldiers killed to our models. We found a non-linear effect for Y2 Δ position.

Table 1: Summary of effects of the number of soldiers killed

<i>Incl. the US</i>	Before 9/11		After 9/11	
	Attention	Position	Attention	Position
Opposition	+	-	+	+
Government	-	-	0	-

<i>Excl. the US</i>	Before 9/11		After 9/11	
	Attention	Position	Attention	Position
Opposition	+	-	0	0

Government	0	0	0	-
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<i>Controlled for party family</i>	Before 9/11		After 9/11	
	Attention	Position	Attention	Position
Opposition	+	+	0	+
Government	+	0	0	0

<i>Combinated Y3 (intensity and position)</i>	Before 9/11	After 9/11		
	Opposition	+	0	
Government	0	0		

<i>Controlled for absolute numbers</i>	Before 9/11		After 9/11	
	Attention	Position	Attention	Position
Opposition	+	+	0	+
Government	+	-	0	0

Table 2. Attention to the military and number of soldiers killed (ex the US)

	Model 1: Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression		Model 2: Soldiers killed x In Office		Model 3: Soldiers killed x 9/11		Model 4: Threeway interaction	
Y1 Δattention	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE
Soldiers killed	.089*	.034	.065	.041	-.072*	.023	.215*	.046
In office	-.009	.069	-.023	.182	-1.51	.830	-.072	.276
Post 9/11	.147*	.074	.171*	.076	.187*	.078	.477*	.160
Soldiers killed x in office			.024	.055			-.255*	.115
Soldiers killed x post 9/11					.124	.063	-.170*	.058
In office x post 9/11							.197	.356
Soldiers killed x in office x post 9/11							.309*	.136
War deaths	-.038*	.018	-.032	.023	.031	.037	-.031	.022
ΔSeatshare	.303	.373	.268	.363	.426	.383	-.458	.415
Constant	-.107	.174	-.135	.230	.457*	.181	-.454*	.213
N (obs)	351		351		351		351	
N (groups)	73		73		73		73	
Wald	20.48*		18.43*		56.42*		451.76*	

* p<.05

Figure 1: Marginal effects of soldiers killed on attention in office in pre- and post 9/11 period (excl US)




Table 3. Position on military issues and number of soldiers killed (excl US)

	Model 5a Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression		Model 6a Soldiers killed x In Office		Model 7a Soldiers killed x 9/11		Model 8a Three way interaction	
Y1 Δposition	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE
Soldiers killed	-.145*	.025	-.152*	.032	-.223*	.038	-.294*	.094
In office	-.194*	.060	-.250	.154	-.179*	.065	-.631	.259
Post 9/11	.656*	.077	.669*	.078	.367*	.108	-.066	.117
Soldiers killed x in office			.025	.056			.138	.112
Soldiers killed x 9/11					.130*	.039	.288*	.045
In office x 9/11							1.02*	.348
Soldiers x in off x 9/11							-.293*	.137
War deaths	.229*	.029	.219*	.029	.247*	.027	.271*	.030
ΔSeatshare	.745	.397	.810	.422	.680	.412	.809	.473
Constant	-2.66*	.348	-2.52*	.348	-2.72	.311	-2.84*	.325
N (obs)	351		351		351		351	
N (groups)	73		73		73		73	
Wald	88.65*		91.11*		98.08*		128.63*	

* p < .05

Figure 2: Marginal effects of soldiers killed on position in office in pre- and post 9/11 period (excl US)




Table 4. Attention to the military and number of soldiers killed (controlled for party family)

	Model 9: Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression		Model 10: Soldiers killed x In Office		Model 11: Soldiers killed x 9/11		Model 12: Threeway interaction	
Y1 Δattention	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE
Soldiers killed	.187*	.017	.199*	.016	.205*	.016	.209	.015
In office	-.162*	.053	.028	.156	-.181*	.052	-.136	.180
Post 9/11	.093	.087	.085	.087	.582*	.232	.492	.274
Soldiers killed x in office			-.061	.045			-.041	.056
Soldiers killed x post 9/11					-.205*	.090	-.198	.101
In office x post 9/11							.054	.539
Soldiers killed x in office x post 9/11							.069	.243
Party family								
Communist	.398*	.178	.401*	.182	.403*	.181	.387	.172
Social Democrat	.537*	.190	.533*	.193	.553*	.192	.552	.185
Liberal	.751*	.247	.715*	.250	.751*	.249	.758	.247
Christian-Democrat	.591*	.187	.578*	.188	.609*	.186	.617	.176
Conservative	-.063	.200	-.010	.213	.008	.219	.013	.211
Nationalist	.414	.285	.409	.287	.388	.287	.377	.283

Agrarian	.806*	.224	.788*	.229	.768*	.228	.753	.215
Ethnic-regionalist	.200	.179	.179	.184	.167	.184	.139	.176
Constant	-1.04*	.182	-1.07*	.186	-1.09*	.185	-1.08	.175
N (obs)	365		365		365		365	
N (groups)	75		75		75		75	
Wald	162.18*		173.41*		192.25*		218.76*	

* p<.05

Figure 3: Marginal effects of soldiers killed on attention in office in pre- and post 9/11 period (controlled for party family)




Table 5. Position on the military and number of soldiers killed (controlled for party family)

	Model 13: Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression		Model 14: Soldiers killed x In Office		Model 15: Soldiers killed x 9/11		Model 16: Threeway interaction	
Y1 Δposition	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE
Soldiers killed	.010	.020	.100*	.027	.009	.007	.039*	.013
In office	-.184*	.060	.545*	.092	.165*	.046	.142	.139
Post 9/11	.400*	.080	.404*	.088	.290	.166	-.226	.185
Soldiers killed x in office			-.278*	.044			-.101	.158
Soldiers killed x post 9/11					.027	.073	.246*	.076

In office x post 9/11						.710	.413
Soldiers killed x in office x post 9/11						-.317	.193
Party family							
Communist	-.434	.228	-.524*	.186	-.419	.251	-.481 .225
Social Democrat	-.458*	.202	-.460*	.142	-.437	.226	-.447 .192
Liberal	-.479*	.231	-.602*	.179	-.446	.255	-.515 .226
Christian-Democrat	-.737*	.197	-.873*	.133	-.717*	.223	-.800 .187
Conservative	-.809*	.239	-.800*	.174	-.790*	.260	-.839 .212
Nationalist	-.530	.284	-.520*	.240	-.499	.298	-.459 .261
Agrarian	-.526*	.253	-.468*	.225	-.496	.274	-.421 .298
Ethnic-regionalist	-.397*	.201	-.476*	.133	-.402	.225	-.473 .186
Constant	.519*	.202	.318*	.145	.504*	.221	.448 .188
N (obs)	365		365		365		365
N (groups)	75		75		75		75
Wald	153.19*		368.89*		84.88*		110.06*

Figure 4: Marginal effects of soldiers killed on position in office in pre- and post 9/11 period (controlled for party family)




Table 6. Combination on intensity and tone on the military and number of soldiers killed

Y3 Δcombination	Model 17: Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression		Model 18: Soldiers killed x In Office		Model 19: Soldiers killed x 9/11		Model 20: Threeway interaction	
	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE
Soldiers killed	.081	.047	.295*	.047	.046	.049	.199*	.061
In office	-.836*	.189	.754*	.383	-.793	.188	.318	.548
Post 9/11	.459*	.126	.543*	.092	.137	.290	.471	.463
Soldiers killed x in office			-.598*	.138			-.370	.190
Soldiers killed x post 9/11					.101	.148	.066	.228
In office x post 9/11							-.009	.909
Soldiers killed x in office x post 9/11							-.071	.389
War deaths	.368*	.061	.475*	.042	.365*	.063	.360*	.061
ΔSeathshare	1.801*	.075	.686	.848	2.042*	.789	.450	.892
Constant	-4.631*	.733	-6.476*	.461	-4.518*	.761	-4.908	.737
N (obs)	173		173		173		173	
N (groups)	40		40		40		40	
Wald	75.58*		999.41*		135.68*		83.19	

* p<.05

Figure 5: Marginal effects of soldiers killed on intensity and tone in office pre- and post 9/11




Table 7: Attention to the military and number of soldiers killed (absolute numbers)

	Model 21: Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression		Model 22: Soldiers killed x In Office		Model 23: Soldiers killed x 9/11		Model 24: Threeway interaction	
Y1 Δattention	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE	β	SE
Soldiers killed	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001	.001	.003*	.001
In office	-.182*	.057	-.098	.068	-.119	.068	-.022	.078
Post 9/11	.079	.072	.056	.070	.098	.073	.106	.089
Soldiers killed x in office			-.000	.000			-.005*	.002
Soldiers killed x post 9/11					-.001	.001	-.003*	.001
In office x post 9/11							-.054	.129
Soldiers killed x in office x post 9/11							.005	.002
War deaths	-3.74e-	3.67e-	-3.84e-	4.95e-	-3.85e-	4.98e-	-3.61e-	5.97e-

post 9/11							.007*	.002
War deaths	1.00e-06*	7.31e-08	1.01e-06*	7.43e-08	8.90e-07*	8.91e-08	1.01e-06*	8.13e-08
ΔSeatshare	.789*	.312	.769*	.366	.756*	.332	.684	.351
Constant	-.414*	.012	-.440	.015	-.357*	.024	-.471	.019
N (obs)	365	365	365	365				
N (groups)	75	75	75	75				
Wald	315.47*	313.96*	175.61*	283.30				

Figure 7: Marginal effects of soldiers killed on position in office in pre- and post 9/11 period (absolute numbers)

